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Law and Heidegger’s Question Concerning 
Technology: A Prolegomenon to Future Law 
Librarianship 
 
Paul D. Callister∗ 
 
“POOR librarians. Soon, no doubt, to go the way of blacksmiths and town criers, 
their chosen field made obsolete by Internet search engines and self-perpetuating 
electronic databases.”1 
 
I. Introduction 
Following World War II, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger offered 
one of the most potent criticisms of technology and modern life.  His nightmare is 
a world whose essence has been reduced to the functional equivalent of “a giant 
gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry.  This 
relation of man to the world [is] in principle a technical one . . . .  [It is] altogether 
alien to former ages and histories.”2  For Heidegger, the problem is not 
                                            
∗ Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Leon E. Bloch Law Library, University of 
Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.  B.A., Brigham Young University, J.D., Cornell Law School, 
M.S.L.I.S., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  The author thanks Elizabeth Bach-Van 
Horn, Richard Danner, James E. Faulconer, Erin Lavelle, Nancy Levit, Travis McDade and 
Yelena Shmidova for their excellent assistance and encouragement. 
1 Neil Genzlinger, The Fog of Facts, N.Y.TIMES, Oct.17, 2004, § 7, at 12, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
2 Martin Heidegger, Memorial Address, in DISCOURSE ON THINKING 50 (John M. Anderson 
& E. Hans Freund trans., Harper Torch Books 1966) (1959).   
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technology itself, but the technical mode of thinking that has accompanied it.  
Such a viewpoint of the world is a useful paradigm to consider humanity’s 
relationship to law in the current information environment, which is increasingly 
technical in Heidegger’s sense of the term.   
Heidegger’s warning that a technical approach to thinking about the world 
obscures its true essence is directly applicable to the effects of current (as well 
as former) information technologies that provide access to law.  The thesis of this 
article is that Heidegger provides an escape, not only for libraries threatened by 
obsolescence by emerging technologies, but for the law itself, which is under the 
same risks of subjugation.  This essay explains the nature of Heidegger’s 
criticisms of technology and modern life and explores the threat specifically 
identified by such criticism, including an illustration based upon systematic 
revision of law in Nazi Germany.  The paper applies Heidegger’s criticisms to the 
current legal information environment and contrasts developing technologies and 
current attitudes and practices with earlier Anglo-American traditions.  Finally, the 
paper will consider the implications for law librarianship in the current information 
environment. 
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II. Heidegger’s Nightmare:  Understanding the Beast 
A. Calculative Thinking and the Danger of Subjugation to a 
Single Will 
The threat is not technology itself; rather the danger to the modern world 
is based in the essence of thinking, which Heidegger describes as “enframing”3 
or “calculative thinking.”4  For Heidegger, the problem is that mankind 
misconstrues the nature of technology as simply “a means to an end.”5  
Heidegger’s articulation of the common conception of technology, as a 
“means,” applies equally well to information technologies, including legal 
databases.  True, it is hard to think of technology in any other way, but what 
Heidegger argues is that this failure to consider the essence of technology is a 
threat to humanity.  An example of how Nazism reduced humanity to a thing to 
be ordered is discussed in Subsection B below. 
Heidegger defines the threat in two ways:  First, humans become 
incapable of seeing anything around them as but things to be brought into 
readiness to serve some end (a concept he refers to as “standing reserve”).6  
                                            
3 See William Lovitt, Introduction, in MARTIN HEIDEGGER, QUESTION CONCERNING 
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS, at xxix (Willliam Lovitt trans., Garland Publ’g 1977) (1955). 
4 Memorial Address, supra note 2, at 46.  
5 Id. at 4. 
6 See Lovitt, supra note 3 (“Today all things are being swept together into a vast network 
in which their only meaning lies in their being available to serve some end that will itself also be 
directed toward getting everything under control.  Heidegger calls this fundamentally 
undifferentiated supply of the available the ’standing reserve.’”).   
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Humans are cut off from understanding the essence of things, and consequently 
their surrounding world.7  Second, man has been reduced in his or her role to the 
“order-er” of things, specifically to some purpose or end, and as a result risks 
becoming something to be ordered as well.8 
Heidegger illustrates these concerns as follows: 
The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all 
appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his 
grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry, 
whether he knows it or not.  He is made subordinate to the orderability of 
cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, 
which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines.  The 
latter, in their set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand.9 
In other words, the trees, the wood, the paper, and even the forester (whose 
ancestors once understood the sanctity of the woods) are ultimately subordinated 
to the will to establish orderly public opinion.  The forester, in proverbial fashion, 
                                            
7 See HEIDEGGER, supra note 3, at 28 (“The rule of Enframing threatens man with the 
possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to 
experience the call of a more primal truth.”). 
8 Id. at 27.  (“As soon as . . . man . . . is nothing but the orderer of standing-reserve, then 
he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is he comes to the point where he himself will 
have to be taken as standing reserve.”). 
9 Id. at 18.  Heidegger finds that man is never completely “transformed into mere standing 
reserve” because of his unique position as the “order-er” of every thing else.  Id. 
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5
“cannot see the forest for the trees.” Instead of appreciating the majesty and 
mystery of the living forest, he sees only fodder for the paper mill, which will pay 
for his next meal. 
The same cynicism might be applied to legal publishing.  Whole forests 
have given their lives to the publication of legal information in order to provide a 
stable basis for society--after all, the “law must be stable and yet it cannot stand 
still,”10 or as our comrades from Critical Legal Studies would put it, law is simply a 
tool “to perpetuate the existing socioeconomic status quo.”11  Cadres of West 
editors (commonly referred to in generic fashion as human resources, ironically 
making them all the less human)12 work feverishly to digest points of law and 
assign 55,000 cases into a taxonomy with over 100,000 class distinctions,13 and 
all for the sake of predictable legal system and stable society. 
                                            
10 ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923). 
11 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 382 (7th ed., 1999).  For a more thorough definition of Critical 
Legal Studies, see John Henry Schlegel, Critical Legal Studies, in OXFORD COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN LAW 202 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002). 
12 HEIDEGGER, supra note 3, at 18 (“If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does 
not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve?  The 
current talk about human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of 
this.”). 
13 See Paul Douglas Callister, Beyond Training:  Law Librarianship’s Quest for the 
Pedagogy of Legal Research Education, 95 LAW LIB. J. 7, 21 (2003) (estimate of number of cases 
being published in West system in print).  I learned that West’s taxonomy has over 100,000 in a 
conversation with Dan Dabney, West’s Senior Director for Research and Development, at an 
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For Heidegger, the threat is revealed in mankind’s perpetual quest to gain 
mastery over technology.  “Everything depends on our manipulating technology 
in the proper manner as a means.  We will, as we say, ‘get’ technology ‘spiritually 
in hand.’  We will master it.  The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the 
more technology threatens to slip from human control.”14  When Heidegger 
published these words (first in 1962, but based on lectures from 1949 and 
1950),15 the implications of nuclear energy and atomic warfare occupied much 
academic discussion.  Heidegger points out that the popular question of this 
period did not concern how to find sufficient energy resources, but “[i]n what way 
can we tame and direct the unimaginably vast amounts of atomic energies, and 
so secure mankind against the danger that these gigantic energies suddenly—
even without military actions—break out somewhere, ‘run away’ and destroy 
everything?”16  The modern question is about our mastery over technology, not 
about sufficiency of resources.   
                                                                                                                                  
AALL convention.  Interestingly, Dabney has recently expressed concern that large systems such 
as the West Topic and Key Number System are limited in effectiveness to their current 100,000 
classes.  See Dan Dabney, A Brief Practical Introduction to Taxonomies, Thompson Legal 
Knowledge and Trends White Paper 7, available at 
http://www.thomson.com/cms/assets/pdfs/legal/westkm_Taxonomies.pdf (last visited Sep. 15, 
2007).  Apparently, humanity’s role as the order-er of things is “at capacity,” and is, presumably, 
in need of technological replacement.  See supra note 9. 
14 HEIDEGGER, supra note 3, at 5. 
15 Lovitt, supra note 3 at ix. 
16 Memorial Address, supra note 2, at 51. 
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Similar concerns are manifest with respect to information technologies, 
where the primary problem is not lack of access, but too much access--for 
example, illegal music file swapping;17 the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
DMCA;18 the trends to use licensing to control and preserve economic value of 
information (and to prohibit otherwise lawfully competitive practices, such as 
reverse engineering);19 and with respect to the field of law and government; 
retraction of government documents;20 the Patriot Act;21 the furor over “non-
                                            
17 David Shepardson, Sony, Others Sue 9 U-M Downloaders; Record Companies Accuse 
Students of Taking Music Illegally .   
18 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) and (b) (_____). 
19 Compare Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (end-user license 
agreement validly prohibited reverse-engineering even when copyright law may have permitted it) 
with Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(reverse-engineering was permitted under fair use when no end-user license agreement 
restrictions banning the practice were an issue in the case). 
20 See, e.g., U.S. Government Printing Office, Statement on Request to Withdraw USGS 
Source-Water CD-Rom from Depository Libraries, News Release No. 02-04, Jan. 16, 2002, 
available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/public-affairs/news/02news04.html. 
21 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 402 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 50 and other titles of the U.S.C.).  See also USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in 
scattered sections of 18, 50 and other titles of the U.S.C.). 
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published,” electronic precedent;22 and the recent frenzy of e-discovery.23  Some 
of the stakeholders seemed to have liked things much better when information 
resources were scarce.24  Universal access is destabilizing—hence, the 
                                            
22 Molly McDonough, Door Slowly Opens for Unpublished Opinions, 5 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 
16 (2006) (Supreme Court announces rule permitting citation of unpublished opinions.).  “Judges 
and lawyers opposed to the citations have referred to unpublished opinions as ‘junk law.’ They 
flooded the advisory committee with some 500 letters opposing the citation rule.”  Id. at ___.  See 
also Stephanie Francis Ward, Giving Their Opinions, 3 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 163 (2004) (Quoting 
federal 9th-Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, "Given the press of our cases, especially screening cases, 
we simply do not have the time to shape and edit unpublished dispositions to make them safe as 
precedent."; Paul Marcotte, Unpublished but Influential: With Technology, Opinions not in the Law 
Books can be Misused, Critics Charge, 77 A.B.A.J. 26 (2001) (“[Lauren] Robel fears, for example, 
that bar groups and scholars will be unable to discern trends in case law covering federal agency 
decision-making because of the growing numbers of unpublished opinions.”).   
23 See, e.g., Carolyn Southerland, Electronic Discovery:  Ignorance of its Minutiae no 
Excuse for Litigators, 28 NAT’L L.J., Jul. 17, 2006, at S3; Kristin M. Nimsger & Michele C. S. 
Lange, E is for Evidence: Examining Recent E-Discovery Developments 23 GEN. PRAC. SOLO 40 
(2006); James M. (Duke) Johnston Jr. & Philip A. Whistler, E-Discovery: A Critical Litigation Issue 
for Franchisors and Franchisees, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 20; Marianne Tolomeo and Brett Kuller, 
Litigation Strategies In Light of Document Retention Requirements for Electronic Records, 19 
TRIAL. PRAC. 6 (2005); David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery: New Power, New Risks, 16 UTAH B.J. 
8 (2003). 
24 The issue is discomfort with the pace of technological change (specifically the speed 
and accuracy of the Internet) and its impact on entertainment industries.  See, e.g.,  Privacy and 
Piracy:  The Pardox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Newtorks and the Impact of the 
Technology on the Entertainment Industry: Senate Hearing 275  Before the Subcom. on 
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considerable interest in getting a “handle” on technology through legal sanction 
and yet additional technological innovation (the so-called “access control” 
technologies).25 
                                                                                                                                  
Permanent investigations, 108th Cong. 18 (2003) (Jack Valenti testified:  “If we just stopped right 
now [referring to development of broadband Internet], if the world just stopped, we would be 
doing fine because we [the motion picture industry] could survive it.”).  Mr. Valenti was particularly 
concerned about the future speed of the Internet. 
Scientists at CalTech have announced “FAST,” an experimental program that 
can download a DVD quality movie in five Seconds!   Can anyone deny that these huge 
download speeds brood over our future?  Can anyone deny that when one can upload 
and download movies in seconds or minutes the rush to illegally obtain films will reach 
“pandemic stage?”   
Id. at 91-92 (prepared statement of Jack Valenti, Preseident & CEO, Motion Picture Association) 
(emphasis added).  The real problem is a lack of scarcity or “friction” in the new technologies—
they are simply too accurate and fast.  See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY:  HOW 
THE CLASH BETWEEN FREEDOM AND CONTROL IS HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND CRASHING THE 
SYSTEM at ix (“Friction” concerns “how closely we should try to make cyberspace conform to and 
resemble the analog world . . . ”), xiii (“[T]he collapse of inconvenience has sparked a series of 
efforts that could reestablish the distance, or friction, that our information systems have featured 
since the rise of moveable type and bound books.”), 13 (Explaining Robert Kaplan’s theories in 
The Coming Anarchy (2000) as resulting from “too many dangerous goods, services, and ideas” 
flowing “without traditional regard for authority and tradition. . . .”), and 87(“The fundamental 
purpose of intellectual property law is to create artificial scarcity.”) (2004). 
25 See, generally VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 24.  “Despite the obvious futility of anti-
piracy efforts, governments throughout the world are shifting to the technological regulation of 
distribution from the human to the technological, and expanding the jurisdiction from the national 
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Heidegger’s genius is that he recognizes that all the fuss about mastering 
technologies, although close to the mark, concerns the wrong issue.  The more 
insidious threat is not nuclear fallout or economic devaluation of intellectual 
property, but the worldview of “calculative” thinking that accompanies rapid 
technological change:  “The world now appears as an object open to attacks of 
calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist.”26  
For Heidegger, calculative thought is not limited to the manipulation of machine 
code or numbers.  Rather, the concept is grounded in “Machiavellian scheming” 
and the pursuit of power.  “Calculative thinking computes.  It computes ever new, 
ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities.  
Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next.”27  The threat Heidegger 
envisions to human thought is even more dangerous than nuclear warfare.28 
Heidegger’s threat is based on the separation of man from his or her 
nature.  By pursuing economic calculation, man is cut off from the transformative 
powers of his or her environment.  In such a world, law does not have the 
                                                                                                                                  
to global.”  Id. at 101.  See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
(1999); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 
(2001) 
26 Memorial Address, supra note 2, at 50. 
27 Id. at 46. 
28 Id. at 52 (“[A]n attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and 
nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little.”). 
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capacity to educate or to provide the basis for social harmony; 29 rather, law like 
any resource must be employed to more economic ends.  The implication is that 
calculative thinking mandates everything (including law) be subjected to a single 
will.  While Heidegger recognized the danger of subjection of everything to a 
single will, the issue of whether, and when, he equated the danger with Nazi 
totalitarianism, which he had originally supported, would require a line of 
historical inquiry far beyond the scope of this article.30  Regardless of 
                                            
29 See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
30 One of the best treatments of the issue is Safranski’s critique of Heidegger’s responses 
to his famous interview with Der Spiegel, which took place on September 23, 1964 in 
Freidenburg, but which was not published until his death.  See RÜDIGER SAFRANSKI, MARTIN 
HEIDEGGER:  BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL 418-21 (Ewald Osers Trans. 1998).  Safranski believes 
Heidegger recognized that Nazism had ultimately been guilty of technological reductionism, as 
used in this article (or reducing the world, including men, to a resource for exploitation).  See id. 
at 420 (”Heidegger pointed out that National Socialism had originally intended to oppose such a 
development [technological reductionism] but had subsequently become its motor.“).  In a review 
of The Heidegger Controversy:  A Critical Reader, Thomas Sheehan is much more skeptical of 
how far (and how soon) Heidegger distanced himself from his initial embrace of Nazism.  See 
Thomas Sheehan, A Normal Nazi, 40 N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 14, 1993, at __, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2701 (last visited on Sept. 11, 2006).   
Heidegger’s disillusionment had to do with the [Nazi] party’s failure to carry out 
Heidegger’s own philosophical program of renewing the promise of the ancient Greek 
polis, overcoming European nihilism, and returning to Germany to a less hectic and more 
simple life.  Thus his so called “break” with official Nazism in the mid-Thirties consisted in 
© 2006, Paul D. Callister.  This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 2.5 License. See 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.5/. 
QuestionLTechr 11.doc
Draft Copy:  1/29/2007 1:31 PM
 
12
Heidegger’s own political and moral journey, Nazism effectively illustrates 
Heidegger’s philosophical fear—that technological thinking risks the “ordering” of 
all the world, including humanity, as resource subject to a singular will. 
B. Subjection of Law to Will—The Nazi Experience 
While serving as a law librarian at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, I learned that a special mission of the Library of Congress had 
seized contents of Nazi libraries following World War II.  As part of a library 
lecture series, university librarians from the Modern Languages and Linguistics 
Library, Tom Kilton and Gail Hueting, discussed items seized by the Library of 
Congress and distributed to various American libraries.  Some of the items were 
held in various University of Illinois campus libraries, but at the time of Professors 
Kilton and Hueting’s presentation, no one had looked seriously at the law school.  
Motivated by the lecture and with some effort, I was able to identify over seventy 
                                                                                                                                  
his decision to be more true to the “inner truth and greatness” of the movement that the 
party every could be. 
Id. at __ (citing ERNST NOLTE, MARTIN HEIDEGGER, POLITIK UND GESCHICTE IN LEBEN UND DENKEN 
(POLTICTS AND HISTORY IN HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT) 164-65 (1992).  For general discussion of 
Heidegger and his affiliation with Nazism, see SAFRANSKI, supra; Sheehan, supra; NOLTE, supra; 
JOHANNES FRITSCHE, HISTORICAL DESTINY AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM IN HEIDEGGER’S BEING AND TIME 
(1999); HUGO OTT, MARTIN HEIDEGGER:  A POLITICAL LIFE (Allan Blunden, trans. 1993); HANS 
SLUGA, HEIDEGGER’S CRISIS:  PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS IN NAZI GERMANY (1993); HEIDEGGER 
CONTROVERSY:  A CRITICAL READER (Richard Wolin, ed 1991);. 
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such items at the law library, and many other legal titles that traced their origin to 
Nazi Germany.31   
As I made my way through some of the legal materials, I was struck by the 
fact that the Nazis did not simply ignore law; rather, they systematically rewrote it 
to their own purposes.  For example, consider the following translation of a Nazi 
business organizations statute: 
The industrial concern of a legal person is considered as Jewish,  
(a) if one or several of the persons appointed as legal 
representation or one or several of the members of the supervisory 
board are Jews;  
(b)  if Jews are crucially involved as to capital or right to vote. 
Crucial participation in capital occurs if more than one quarter of the 
capital belongs to Jews; crucial participation as to right to vote 
occurs if the Jewish voices (voters) reach half of the total number of 
voices (voters).32 
                                            
31 See generally, Library Lines: A Reminder to Never Forget the Past, ILL. JURIST, Spring 
2002, at 25-26; Gail Hueting, Special Collections in German Studies in North American Libraries 
(rev. 2005), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~wessweb/gdgspeccoll.html (item no. 16, National 
Socialist Literature, briefly describes the 17,000 volumes held by the University of Illinois as part 
of the Cooperative Acquisitions Project for Wartime Publications). 
32 HEINRICH SCHÖNFELDER, DEUTSCHE REICHSGESETZE SAMMLUNG DES VERFASSUNGS, 
GEMEIN, STRAF UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS FÜR DEN TÄGLICHEN GEBRAUCH ___ § 10a (13th ed., 
1943) (passage translated by this author). 
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The section then goes on to address issues of subsidiaries and mining 
enterprises.33  Having been a tax attorney in a former life, I am struck by the 
technical precision and lengths to which Nazi draftsmen went to define “Jewish” 
business entities.  Technical definitions of “controlled groups” and “closely held” 
corporations illustrate similar precision in draftsmanship with respect to U.S. tax 
law, but without the anti-Semitism.34  The Nazis, at least in 1934, did not simply 
ignore the law; they reworked it with great care and precision to their own ends. 
A Nazi legal academy, complete with law professors, some of whom 
sported Nazi pins or armbands, systematically set about to rewrite the law 
according Nazi ideals.35  From a translated forward to the Academy for German 
Law Yearbook 1933/34, Dr. Hans Frank, Director of the German Academy of 
                                            
33 Id. 
34 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 447(h) and 1563 (_____). 
35 See, e.g., AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT, JAHRBUCH 1936, at vi-vii, illus. Ii (Dr. Hans 
Frank in Nazi Uniform as President of Academie für Deutsches Recht) and 144-45, illus. vi (Dr. 
Karl Lasch, Director of the Academie, sporting a Nazi lapel pin).  Note that in 1936 Heidegger 
declined to attend a Descartes conference in France with the German delegation intended as a 
forum to reconcile Nazi socialism with European philosophy.  See SAFRANSKI, supra note 30, at 
324-25 (Ewald Osers trans., Harvard University Press 1998) (1994).  Many of the German 
academia wore Nazi uniforms.  Id. at 325. 
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Justice, reveals his own “instrumental”36 attitudes about German law and legal 
academia when he writes: 
Being entrusted with the Fuhrer’s call for the revision of the German 
empire’s legal system, . . . I have the Academy for German Justice, which 
shall demand the reorganization of the German legal life in close and 
lasting conjunction with the proper authorities for the legislation of the 
National Socialist program . . . . 
. . . Germany has at its disposal the greatest jurist's organization of 
the world, the Union of National Socialist German Jurists, to set down a 
method of working, which differs from the lawmaking of fundamental 
liberalist aims.  In hardly any other area of life has the parliamentary 
methods of the party state had a more fatal effect than in the field of the 
lawmaking and legislation.37   
In other words, the law was too important a tool to be entrusted to politicians.38  
Both law and legal academia were put to the service of the Nazi “machine.”   
                                            
36 Throughout this article, I use “instrumental” in the same sense as Heidegger uses 
“technical” or “calculative” to refer the reduction of law and legal information to “resources” to be 
ordered to some end.  See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. 
37 Hans Frank, Vorwort, in AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT, JAHRBUCH 1933/34, at 5-6 
(passage translated by this author). 
38 See id. (“Here, in the past, the former state’s anonymous playground accounted only to 
extracted economic and political power groups.”).   
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As Führer, Hitler was exalted to the status of a legal concept.  In 1940, J. 
Walter Jones (Fellow of Queen’s College at Oxford) described the Führer as one 
of two principles upon which the Nazi conception of law was based (the other 
principle being racial homogeneity).39  Having reviewed Nazi writings on the 
subject, Jones observes: 
The efficiency of all political and legal machinery is judged by the 
smoothness and speed which it brings to the functioning of the Nation 
State.  Action, instant and overwhelming, must be the primary purpose of 
the State. . . . Therefore, State action is dependent on the existence of a 
Leader (Führer) and on unquestioning faith in the creed of leadership.” 40 
This nice little syllogism justifies totalitarian rule on the basis of expedient state 
action.  
In June, 1934, the same Dr. Hans Frank, then the Bavarian Justice 
Minister as well as Director of the Academy of German Justice, phoned Hitler to 
inquire about the “legal grounds” to carry out Hitler’s order to execute nineteen 
leaders of the Brownshirts (the Röhm putsch), then being held in Frank’s care.  
Hitler’s response: “I’ll tell you that the legal grounds for everything that happens 
                                            
39 See J. WALTER JONES, NAZI CONCEPTION OF LAW 4-5 (Pamphlets on World Affairs, 
Series No. 21, 1940). 
40 Id. at 5. 
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is the very existence of the Reich!”41  Being thoroughly converted to Hitler’s 
cause, Dr. Frank would later declare, “[S]ince the foundation of the National 
Socialist State is National Socialist law and order, the Supreme Führer is by 
definition also our supreme judge, that his will must now be the foundation of our 
law and order.”42  The nightmare of the world as gasoline station was realized 
into the rule of a single will.   
Returning to Dr. Frank, not surprisingly the jurist closed his telephone 
conversation with Hitler by committing to carry out the executions;43 the German 
concept of order (in the sense of laying the foundation of the Third Reich) 
demanded it.  Later, as Governor of occupied Poland, Dr. Frank would extend 
the same reasoning from nineteen to seventeen thousand: “We must not be 
squeamish when we hear of seventeen thousand Poles executed.”44  Dr. Frank, 
who began his career as a defense attorney, and then progressed to a legal 
academic, would ultimately be convicted at Nuremburg and hung for his actions 
as governor of occupied Poland.45 
                                            
41 NIKLAS FRANK, IN THE SHADOW OF THE REICH 85  (Arthur S. Wensinger & Carole Clew-
Hoey trans.,1991) (1975) (Hans Frank’s son recounted the phone conversation in an 
impassioned biography condemnation of Hans Frank's life and deeds as a jurist and Nazi 
officer.). 
42 Id. at 72 (parenthetical comments of biographer omitted) (emphasis added). 
43 Id. at 85. 
44 Id. at 128. 
45 See generally, FRANK, supra note 41. 
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The point of this painful odyssey through Nazi law is to illustrate the 
extremes to which law can be reduced to serve some end and be subjugated to a 
single will.  In the words of Dr. Hans Frank, “the Academy for German Law in 
almost all important fields of law has supplied an abundance of valuable 
suggestions and contributions for the realization of the National Socialist legal 
will.”46  It is to the realization of will that law, when reduced to the status of a 
technological tool as a result of calculative thinking, ultimately succumbs. 
C. The Modern American Version—Law and the Billable Unit 
In contemporary America, the technological yoking of law to will—its whole 
scale conversion to “standing reserve”—is infinitely less inimical and perceptible 
than in Nazi Germany, but the danger is there, nonetheless.  It is the subtle shift 
in attitudes that accompanying new legal technologies to which law librarians, 
and ultimately the legal profession, must direct their attention. 
While describing an experimental system that seamlessly combines brief 
writing on the word processor with legal research—to facilitate a kind of self-
researching brief—Dr. Dan Dabney, Senior Director of Research and 
Development, Thomson West, observes:  “[W]hat is happening here, at least 
potentially, is that legal research has ceased to be a particularly separate part of 
the operation.  You can just sit down and write a brief and the authorities you 
                                            
46 Frank, supra note 37, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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need, the law that you are looking for, will find you.”47  Dabney’s education as an 
information scientist is apparent.  He quite capably connects technological 
developments with search behavior.   
More importantly, Dabney connects legal search behaviors with underlying 
attitudes about legal arguments.  In fact, Dabney illustrates that the behavior and 
attitudes this new product (the self-researching brief) facilitates are not really 
new.  He quotes a former law partner: “You know when I write a brief, I do the 
legal research last.  I write the brief and when I see something that probably 
needs authority I just put in ‘(cite)’ and go on and write something else.  But you 
can make the argument because you know what the arguments are going to 
be.”48  West’s new technology is not really to blame for this attitude.  After all, the 
technology simply facilitates the calculative thinking and culture already at the 
root of the legal profession.  West and other publishers simply meet existing 
demand for information services and products that supply authority for the 
arguments legal practitioners have already decided to make.   
Dabney’s most interesting observation explores the philosophical 
underpinnings of such calculative attitudes. 
                                            
47 Dan Dabney, Envisioning the Future: The Publisher's Perspective, Future of Law 
Libraries Symposium, held by the Florida Coastal School of Law, Thompson West and InfiLaw 
System (Mar. 10-11, 2005), mms://broadcast.cali.org/foll05/DanDabney.wmv (quoted passage 
transcribed by this author). 
48 Id. 
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[T]he reason that my colleague was so proud of this is that it 
reflected his rather cynical attitude about the law itself.  There is no sense 
in which the law informs you at all.  You are creating the law that was 
necessary to your purposes on the fly and you were never going to 
discover that law wasn’t the way you wanted it to be.  This [is], you know, 
the legal realist mentality:  There is plenty of law out there for everyone.49 
The triumph of legal realism is facilitated by the information environment.  
Indeed, Grant C. Gilmore made the argument back in 1961 that realism is a 
reaction of the information environment to the presence of too many cases in the 
system.50 
Even in the Anglo-American tradition, the same society that triumphed 
over Nazism and Fascism, the prevailing viewpoint is technological and 
calculative.  Heidegger’s fears are apt criticism of American capitalism as well as 
totalitarian ideologies:  “‘Calculation’ stands for Americanism, ‘planning’ for 
communism, and ‘cultivation’ for National Socialism.”51  The labels may differ but 
the methods of Western ideologies all share calculative thinking at their core.  
Modern thinking about law is also calculative in nature.  After all, the 
principle of flexible stability, the “[l]aw must be stable and yet it cannot stand 
                                            
49 Id.(emphasis added).  
50 See Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism:  Its Cause and Cure, YALE L.J. 1037, 1041, 1045 
(1960-61). 
51 SAFRANSKI, supra note 30, at 296. 
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still,”52 the oft-recited declaration with which Roscoe Pound opens Interpretations 
of Legal History, and which is engraved above the moot courtroom at Cornell 
Law School, facilitates predictability, economic growth, and the general welfare.  
While Pound’s quote has been elevated to the status of a legal maxim, what is 
less known is the underlying rationale.  “The social interest in general security 
has led men to seek some fixed bases for an absolute ordering of human action 
whereby a firm and stable social order might be assured.”53  Again, it is the will to 
order which drives modern, instrumental conceptions of law.54  Law is simply the 
basis for “ordering human action,” although as Pound argues, the resulting 
construct must be flexible to be successful.  Heidegger’s description of technical 
and calculative thinking, based upon willing order, corresponds nicely to this 
modern conception of law. 
Turning to other modern theorists, the conception of law is equally 
calculative and instrumental in nature.  Ronald Dworkin’s paradigm of law as the 
unending chain story also functions to maximize the values of stability and 
predictability.55  Another luminary of jurisprudence, H.L.A. Hart stresses law’s 
“value as an instrument for the realization of human purposes.”56  Normative 
                                            
52 POUND, supra note 10. 
53 Id. (emphasis added). 
54 Id. 
55 See generally, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228-38(1986) 
56 H.L.A. Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 136, 
136-37 (Lord Lloyd of Hamstead ed., 4th ed. 1979). 
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theories of law and economics exult in the efficient administration of the general 
welfare.57  Noting law’s instrumental character, Richard Posner comes closest to 
identifying the technological nature (in Heidegger’s sense) of law, by arguing:  “I 
myself do not think law is a humanity.  It is a technique of government.”58  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Sr., noted poet and father of the eminent Supreme Court 
Justice, also saw law in a technical and instrumental context:  “Law is an 
implement of society which is intended for every-day work.”59  Holmes, Jr., while 
not using technical language, comments on the historical origins of law saying 
that “the earliest appearance of law was as a substitute for the private feuds 
between families or clans.”60  In sum, the modern, instrumental conception of law 
is clear.  Law is fundamentally a resource for stability in an unstable world.  In 
Heidegger’s terms, law appears as standing reserve—as something to be 
                                            
57 See Eric Talley, Theory of Law and Economics, in OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN 
LAW 485, 486 (Kermit Hall ed., 2002) 
58 Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature:  A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351, 
1392 (1986) (Posner criticizes efforts in the law and humanities but agrees that as a technique, 
law is “tied to the creation of and interpretation of texts” which can benefit “from sympathetic 
engagement with literature,” at least on his terms). 
59 Oliver Wendell Homes, Sr., Pages from an Old Volume of Life, in OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR. , 8 WORKS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 323 (Standard Library ed., Scholarly Press 
1972) (1892) (emphasis added) [Check page number in modern edition].  Holmes, Sr. continues: 
“It [law] is a course tool and not a mathematical instrument.”  Id. 
60 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., COMMON LAW 248 (LITTLE, BROWN & CO. 1923) (1881). 
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ordered, with the rest of the world to some end.61  Small wonder that, besides 
Heidegger’s philosophical definition, standing reserve is, quite appropriately, a 
accounting concept for assessing resources in the military and energy 
industries.62 
Reducing law to standing reserve may seem unnecessarily perfunctory, 
especially since it is hard to think of the law in any other way.  Indeed, the 
profession speaks of legal information, like other information, as a resource to be 
mined, harvested, ordered, quantified (in billable units no less), packaged, 
marketed and ultimately consumed to some calculated end or purpose, which in 
turn will serve some other overarching end or purpose.  A quick survey of product 
literature reinforces the commoditization of legal information and law:   
                                            
61 See supra note 6. 
62 See, e.g., David Newbery, Electricity Liberalization in Britain and the Evolution of 
Market Design, in ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM:  AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 120 (Fereidoon 
Perry Sioshansi & Wolfgang Pfaffenberger eds., 2006) (illustrating concept of energy reserves); 
M. Rashidinejad, Y.H. Song, & M.H. Javidi, Ancillary Services I:  Pricing and Procurement of 
Reserves, in OPERATION OF MARKET-ORIENTED POWER SYSTEMS 232 (Yong-Hua Song & Xi-Fan 
Wang eds.,  2003) (illustrating concept of energy reserves);  Carlos Pascual, State Department 
Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, Remarks at Woodrow Wilson Center Discussion: 
United States Post Conflict Capacity (Oct. 20, 2004), at LEXISNEXIS CONGRESSIONAL, FEDERAL 
NEWS SERVICE (2004) (discussing role of foreign service supporting military through rotating 
through “Standing Reserve”). 
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• “Try CQ Legislative Impact and you’ll see how this service can 
streamline your work by pinpointing the exact places where pending 
legislation would change existing laws.”63 
• Advertisement with photo of attorney in front of circus booth labeled, 
“Estrellas Prophecies.”  He asks, “How will my judge rule on this 
issue?”  The subtitle for the advertisement reads, “There’s a better way 
to get a real indication of how your judge might rule on a specific 
issue—strategic court-records research on LexisNexis Courtlink.”64 
• “Draft high-quality, winning legal briefs, motions and pleadings faster 
and more accurately with Shepard’s BriefCheck for the Web . . . .”65 
• “When you need an answer to the question, ‘Is my case good law?’, 
there’s no question which system provides a more comprehensive or 
more focused answer.”66 
                                            
63 Letter from Congressional Quarterly, Inc. (undated 2006) (copy on file with author). 
64 LexisNexis advertisement, 91 ABA JOURNAL, Feb. 2005, at 7 (“Revealing court-records 
research is just one way LexisNexis gives litigators a strategic advantage, often before their case 
ever goes to trial.”). 
65 New Shepard’s BriefCheck for the Web, 6 LEXIS NEXIS INFORMATION PROFESSIONAL 
UPDATE 93 (2006). 
66 Lexis Auto-Cite advertisement, 77 ABA JOURNAL, August 1991; 45 (“When it comes to 
building strong cases, there’s strength in numbers [of precedent].”). 
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• “Westlaw Litigator can help you in every aspect of your case and at 
every stage of the process.  It puts all your key litigation resources in 
one place to save you time.”67 
• “Only ALR gives you the assurance you haven’t missed any case on 
your point.”68 
• “In addition to finding the primary law, you can check your firm’s legal 
arguments against those of the legal profession’s heavy hitters.”69 
• “Thanks to KeyCite and Table of Authorities, you can relax knowing 
that nothing affecting the precedential value of a cited authority will 
escape your notice.”70 
The common theme from the vendor literature is simple:  legal information 
resources are essential tools, which make the practice of law more efficient.  
They even proffer competitive advantage and a sense of security.  Furthermore, 
these information resources put the law at the users “finger tips” so that nothing 
is missed, or in Heidegger’s terms, the resources bring law into the order of 
                                            
67 Westlaw Litigator advertisement, at 90 ABA JOURNAL, Mar. 2004, at 3. 
68 Lawyers Cooperative Publishing advertisement for ALR, 77 ABA JOURNAL, July 1991, 
at 15. 
69 Tim Nixon, How Online Briefs Save Time, 7 LAW LIBRARIANS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, 
May-Jun. 2004, at 7 (commenting on West’s Online Briefs) 
70 Jay Shuck, WestCheck Meets the World Wide Web, in 7 LAW LIBRARIANS IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM, Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 5. 
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standing reserve.  As Dabney has pointed out,71 law appears to have the same 
characteristics as the information services that provide access to it because 
through such systems the law always stands ready to supply argument for any 
occasion or proposition.  The question is how to possibly think otherwise.  More 
importantly, has Heidegger’s nightmare of the world as a “gasoline station” been 
realized? 
III. Daring to Think Otherwise—“In-formative” Reading 
Dabney’s use of inform (as in “there is no sense in which the law informs 
you”) is quite interesting and entirely consistent with his behavioral approach, 
including conceptual linkages to legal realism.  Information evolved from the Latin 
informare as in “the action of forming matter, such as stone, wood, leather, etc.” 
or with respect to informing humans, “the action of informing; formation or 
molding of the mind or character, training, instruction, teaching; communication 
of instructive knowledge.”72  To inform was transformative of character, with 
respect to material objects or the human mind and character.  Following World 
War II, however, there was a shift to a more technical or calculating meaning 
(consistent with Heidegger’s sense of term) of the term information to “define 
anything that was sent over an electric or mechanical channel.”73  In 1949, 
pioneers of information sciences pioneers, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver 
                                            
71 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
72 RICHARD SAUL WURMAN, INFORMATION ANXIETY 38 (1989). 
73 Id. 
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defined information as “that which reduces uncertainty.”74  The utility of 
information having been established; it is now a proper “resource.”  Being 
dedicated to “reducing uncertainty,” information bears remarkable relationship to 
order, or ordering, and fit easily with Heidegger’s concept of “standing reserve.” 
The same is true of law.  As discussed previously, legal information 
reduces uncertainty through providing access to a stable system of rules for 
resolving disputes in a predictable way.75  In short, law is the tool, perhaps the 
principle one, for ordering our world.  It is no surprise that the law is often made 
up of “ord-inance” (deriving from order).76  Indeed, the German gesetz, translated 
as law, also means “to place” as in “to set down order.”77  Returning to legal 
information, the major legal publishers facilitate this ordering in remarkable way, 
with “Exhibit A” being West’s Topic and Key Number system.   
The interpretation of information as a tool for reducing order, however, 
contrasts with the sense that Dr. Dabney may have meant for the term inform, 
which is in its pre-war, non-technological sense, of the information informing the 
reader. It is the individual user’s understanding and character which is formed, 
molded and educated.  It is in this sense that Isocrates and Plato referred to law: 
                                            
74 Id. at 39 (citing CLAUDE SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATION (1949)). 
75 See supra notes 59 and accompanying text. 
76 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Online Draft Revision Sept. 2004) (etymological 
entry for “ordinance”). 
77 See id. (2nd ed. 1989) (Online 2006) (etymological entry for “law”). 
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“Isocrates claims that proliferation of laws and the search for akribeia (‘precision’) 
[perhaps anther reference to order] was to miss the real function of law, which 
was to be general and morally educative.”78  Plato shared a similar vision with 
respect to law severing an instructional function and promoting social harmony.  
“Laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them how 
they may live on friendly terms with one another, and partly for the sake of those 
who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued, or softened, or 
hindered from plunging into evil.”79  Plato’s analogy of philosophy curing the ills of 
the soul like a doctor applying medicine to a sick patient is particularly apt here.80  
“[J]ustice is a moral physician and cures men of their excesses and makes them 
better people.”81  This is the original sense of legal information, which stresses in-
forming or educating and molding members of society. 
While browsing a well-known rare book store in Salt Lake City, I happened 
upon a third edition from 1633 of Lord Edward Coke’s First Part of the Institutes 
of the Laws of England (otherwise known as the Coke’s Commentary on 
                                            
78 S.C. Todd, The Language of Law in Classical Athens, in MORAL WORLD OF THE LAW 17, 
22 (Peter Coss ed., 2000) (citing Isocrates §§ 7.33, 7.39-40).  See also Paul D. Callister, Law’s 
Box:  Law, Jurisprudence and the Information Ecosphere, 74 UMKC L. REV. 263, 277-78 (pointing 
out the advantages of Stelae as a medium for education through law).   
79 PLATO, Laws IX, in DIALOGUES OF PLATO 266 (Benjamin Jowett trans., MacMillan & Co., 
1892). [Search for quote in modern edition] 
80 PLATO, GORGIAS (Walter Hamilton ed., Penguin Books, 1960, 1986 prtg.) 69-71 
81 Id. at 70.  
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Littleton),82 which I acquired for my law school.  The volume is particularly 
valuable because of the marginalia, evidence of provenance, and other 
inscriptions, including one from the cover sheet bearing a quote in Latin from 
Quintilian from the first century A.D.  This quote reveals something about the 
relationship of the reader to the text.  “Those who strive to reach the heights will 
always rise higher than those who, giving up on their goals because of despair, 
immediately halt at the lowest levels.”83  The quote is not a testimonial about the 
ease and usefulness of the book, or its utility as a “resource”; rather, it 
emphasizes the journey which the reader must undertake, and the transformation 
that is the ultimate reward of the book.   
Professor Frederick Hicks, whose legacy as a legal bibliographer and 
teacher is dear to this profession, recognized the difficulty readers had with 
Coke’s monumental work, remarking: “This ‘painful volume,’ has become a 
symbol for all books which, sparing neither author nor reader in going to the 
                                            
82 EDWARD COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (3rd ed. 
corrected, London, M.F.I.H. & R.T. assigns of I. More, esq., 1633) 
83 Translation of handwritten inscription from dedication page of UMKC law library’s copy 
of Coke’s Institutes.  See id. The inscription comes from Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria and reads:  
“Altius ibunt qui ad summa nitentur quam qui praesumpta desperatione qua velint evadendi 
protinus circa ima substiterint.”  Email from Holly M. Sypniewski, Ph.D., Department of Classics 
Studies, Millsapps College, to Elisabeth Bach-Van Horn, Legal Research Assistant, UMKC 
School of Law (Aug. 16, 2006).  See 1 INSTITUTIO ORATORIA OF QUINTILIAN 14-15 (bk. I preface, l. 
20) (E. Capps, T.E. Page, & W.H.D. Rouse eds., H.E. Butler trans., London, William Heinemann 
1920) (n.d.). 
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bottom of things [and] say the last on the subjects of which they tread.”84  
Fundamentally, the prominent legal texts in earlier times bore a different 
relationship to readers and students than the legal information resources of 
today.  Prior texts emphasized in-forming the student.  Modern texts are more 
easily accessed, perused, and searched in both print and digital (including 
convenient “cut-and-paste”) formats. 
This modern change in the relationship of readers to legal texts is 
demonstrated in Otto Preminger’s film, Anatomy of a Murder.85  In the film, which 
explores the insanity defense, or “irresistible impulse,” the lawyer for the defense, 
Jimmy Stuart’s character, Paul Biegler, does something incomprehensible in the 
modern practice of law.  Mr. Biegler and his alcoholic colleague, actually choose 
to spend their leisure time drinking bourbon whisky and reading from case 
reporters—from decisions by Justice Holmes no less.86  For a practicing lawyer 
to find recreation in reading case reporters, let alone spend significant time to 
ponderously read cases under any circumstances (while tippling with a 
                                            
84 FREDERICK HICKS, MEN AND BOOKS FAMOUS IN THE LAW, 96-97 (1921)(1991 prtg.). 
85 ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Carlyle Productions, Inc. 1959). 
86 Id.  (Parnell queries Paul Biegler: “Well, what shall we read this evening?  How about a 
little Chief Justice Homes?”) 
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colleague), probably strikes most present-day attorneys as anachronistic, if not 
an outright Hollywood fabrication.87 
As unusual as the behavior of the fictional attorneys in Anatomy of a 
Murder may seem, there was indeed a time when reading (other than the 
condensed cases and heavily edited versions presented in the classroom) was 
dear to the profession.  Professor Berring noted that “Daniel Webster probably 
read every case that was published by every American appellate court, and 
probably read English cases as well.”88  In 1769, another model American, John 
Rutledge wrote a telling letter to his brother Edward, who was then studying law 
in England.  The letter advises: 
[W]ith regard to particular law books—Coke’s Institutes seem to be almost 
the foundation of our law.  These you must read over and over, with the 
greatest attention, and not quit him till you understand him thoroughly, and 
have made your own everything in him, which is worth taking out. . . . I 
would read every case reported from that time [the Glorious Revolution of 
1688] to the present [1769]. . . . I would have you, also, read the Statute 
Laws throughout . . . . When I say you should read such a book, I do not 
                                            
87 The 1959 movie is based on a book of the same title by John D. Voelker (writing under 
the name of Robert Traver) originally published in 1958.  See ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A 
MURDER (1958).  
88 Robert C. Berring, Collapse of The Structure Of The Legal Research Universe: The 
Imperative Of Digital Information, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 9, 19 (1994). 
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mean just to run cursorily through it, as you would a newspaper but to 
read it carefully and deliberately, and transcribe what you find useful in it.89   
Both John and Edward Rutledge would serve as Delegates to the General 
Congress prior to the American Revolution and later as governors of South 
Carolina.  Edward Rutledge would sign the Declaration of Independence, and 
John would serve as a Justice on the Supreme Court and Chief Justice of the 
South Carolina Supreme Court.90  Other examples of equally prodigious readers 
of American law are easy to find.91   
In any event, at the heart of an English and early American legal 
education, was reading, and not just perusing, but a painstaking, purposefully 
repetitive, and comprehensive study of works (as of 1769, eighty-one years of 
cases), resulting in extensive personal annotation and transcribed notes.  So 
voracious was the reading of the nineteenth and early-twentieth century bar that 
courts justified selecting decisions for publications (rather than publishing every 
                                            
89 JOHN BELTON O’NEALL, 2 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA 124-26 (Charleston, S.G. Courtenay & Co. 1859). 
90 See id. at 17-19, 115, and 120.  See also John Rutledge, in ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 
ONLINE, http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9064520 (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). 
91 See, e.g., MOORFIELD STOREY AND EDWARD W. EMERSON, EBENEZER ROCKWOOD HOAR 
30 (1911) (Mr. Hoar Served as Supreme Court Justice for Massachusttes); ILLINOIS STATE BAR 
ASSOCIATION, ADDRESS OF HON. HENRY W. BLODGETT UPON THE EARLY BAR OF CHICAGO 6-7 
(Chicago, Chicago News Co. 1896) (discussing reading habits of Illinois State Supreme Court 
Justice, John Dean Canton). 
© 2006, Paul D. Callister.  This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 2.5 License. See 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.5/. 
QuestionLTechr 11.doc
Draft Copy:  1/29/2007 1:31 PM
 
33
decision) to help cut down the reading.  “The leading lawyers in every State are 
expected to run over, if they do not read, every case in every new volume of its 
reports.  Every case dropped [from publication] lightens the task.”92  Indeed, law 
was the profession of readers.  The question is why?  Was it simply a matter of 
being the best armed for court or is there something deeper, more noble going 
on? 
The very essence of being a lawyer was to be bookish.  In a delightful 
article published in 1937, legal historian Max Radin explains the seventeenth-
century work of Sir Edward Coke and its effect on modern legal scholarship on 
the basis of its grounding in books.93  However, the purpose of such reading is 
best understood from Lord Coke himself.  Coke’s writings go beyond “making the 
case” to include something more beneficial, such as informing of the reader and 
improving individual self-governance in accordance with law.  Coke quotes 
parliament about the reason for publishing his magnum opus, the Laws and 
Institutes, in English, rather than the customary legal French: 
That the Lawes and Customes of this Realme the rather should be 
reasonably perceived and knowne, and better understood by the tongue 
used in this Realme, and by so much every man might the better governe 
himselfe without offending the Law. . . . [G]ood governance and full right is 
done to every man, because that the Lawes and Customes be learned 
                                            
92 SIMEON E. BALDWIN, AMERICAN JUDICIARY 274 (1905). 
93 Max Radin, On Legal Scholarship 46 Yale L. J. 1124, 1127 (1936-1937). 
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and used in the Tongue of the Country”: as more at large by the said Act . 
. . . No man ought to be wiser than the Law.94 
The highest purpose of publishing law is so that individuals may better govern 
themselves.   
The moral essence and transformative character of law books is 
evidenced in several ways.  For instance, early English judges and attorneys 
elected to read Littleton’s Tenures each Christmas.95  Together with the Bible, 
such books came to represent individual conscience.  In 1648, during the 
Interregnum, Judge David Jenkins was accused before the House of Commons 
of being a Royalist.  In prospect of hanging, the Judge found strength in his 
books:  “Multitudes, no doubt, will come to see [this] old Welsh Judge hanged.  I 
shall go with the venerable Bracton’s book hung on my left shoulder, and the 
Statutes at Large on my right.  I will have the Bible, with a ribbon put round my 
neck, hanging on my breast.”96  The symbolic moral force that an English judge 
                                            
94 COKE, supra note 82, at vi.   
95 2 WESTMINSTER HALL OR PROFESSIONAL RELICS AND ANECDOTES OF THE BAR, BENCH, AND 
WOOLSACK 8 (London, John Knight & Henry Lacey 1825) (describing Roger North as the model 
law student).  See also GILBERT J. CLARK, 2 LIFE SKETCHES OF EMINENT LAWYERS: AMERICAN, 
ENGLISH, AND CANADIAN 101 (Kansas City, Lawyer’ International Co. 1895); HICKS, supra note 84, 
at 95. 
96 WILLIAM RALPH DOUTHWAITE, GRAY’S INN: ITS HISTORY & ASSOCIATIONS 212 (London, 
Reeves & Turner 1886). 
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placed upon the Bible, Bracton and the Statutes belies a reverence to legal 
bibliography alien to the modern practice of law. 
Turning from legal information and bibliography to the law itself, the law 
has at various times in history functioned as a transformative agent, rather than 
as simply another instrument or resource for ordering the world.  While this topic 
could only be addressed sufficiently in a paper exclusively devoted to that 
purpose, a few examples are in order.  The thirteenth century Charter of 
Kurkukan Fuga (forming the Empire of Mali), as kept by oral tradition, provides 
for the division of classes, rules for collective escheat, transfer of property, fixing 
dowry, etc., but also for positive relations among family members, avoidance of 
vanity, respect for seniority, tolerance for religious beliefs, protection of 
foreigners, minimization of offenses against women, joking among classes, and 
description of ideal leadership.97  The point is that with the Charter of Kurkukan 
Fuga, there is little division between legal and normative standards which 
                                            
97 See Articles 1-4 (social classes), 7 (tolerance among relations), 14 (offense of women), 
22 (vanity), 24 (treatment of foreigners), 29 (dowrey), 32 (acquiring property), 33 (escheat), and 
(43) (joking) of the Charter of Kurukan Fuga.  See Magoné Niang, The Kurkukan Fuga Charter:  
An Example of Endogeus Governance Mchanism for Conflict Prevention 6-8(Sahel and West 
Africa Club/OECD, Inter-generational Forum on Enogenous Governance in West Africa, Working 
Document, Workshop No. 2, June 26-18, 2006), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/55/37341473.pdf.  See also Fatou K. Camara, Democracy in a 
Plural Society:  The Charter of Kurukan Fuga (Empire of Mali – 1235), 8 (qualities of leadership), 
9 (religious tolerance) (Salzburg Seminar, Session 435: The Rule of Law: Reconciling Religion 
and Culture in a Constitutional Framework, Oct. 9, 2006) (copy on file with author). 
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modern legal practitioners and theorists would recognize.  This ancient African 
law functioned in a way that transformed individuals by encouraging tolerance, 
respect, leadership, diversity, virtue and even humor.   
Also drawing from Africa, the Egyptian Demotic Code of Hermopolis West 
(dating from about 730-715 B.C. in the Twenty Fourth Dynasty) is of the same 
tradition as both Egyptian wisdom literature and the narrative classic, the Tale of 
the Eloquent Peasant.98  Returning to Europe, the ancient Celts lacked a clear 
separation between legal maxim and aphorism or gnomic literature,99 intimating 
that a common tradition functioned in both fashions (to both resolve disputes and 
instruct character).  Finally, the law functions in similar fashion in Classical 
Greece.  Plato’s Laws suggest that “solemn custom often prevails over that of 
statute.”100  Indeed, “custom as promulgated orally in the medium of Homer’s 
Iliad is an interweaving of both private and public codes of conduct.”101  Thus, 
Homer’s classic works may be as apt a source for law as any statute, and 
probably much more transformative in effective. 
Moving to ancient Anglo-Saxon legal traditions, a quick survey of law 
suggests that it functioned merely as an efficient mechanism for administering 
                                            
98 See Callister, supra note 78, at 293-94. 
99 Id. at 319-20. 
100 ERIC A. HAVELOCK, PREFACE TO PLATO 62-63. 
101 Callister, supra note 78, at 279 (citing HAVELOCK, supra note 100, at 76). 
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punishments and avoiding violence,102 much as Holmes, Jr. had noted.103  
However, the curious title of the fourteenth century code of customary law, 
known as the Sachsenspiegel (translated “Saxon Mirror)”, suggests the need for 
much deeper understanding.   
The mirror genre examines the metaphysical and intellectual dimensions 
of subjects such as virtue, law, and rulership.  Such mirrors, written in 
Latin, informed and instructed the next generation. . . . Eike’s lawbook 
[Der Sachsenspiegel] fits this tradition, but, significantly it also marks the 
first such instructional prose text to appear in the vernacular.  Eike 
borrowed the concept from the well-known twelfth-century mirror, 
Honorius Augustodunensis’s Speculum ecclesiae, in which the Bride of 
Christ looks in a mirror to find those faults in herself that might be 
objectionable to Christ.104 
                                            
102 See generally, LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS (F.L. Attenborough ed. and 
trans., Clark, New Jersey, 2006) (1922); LAWS OF THE SALIAN AND RIPURIAN FRANKS (Theodore 
John Rivers trans. 1986).  Similar comparisons can be made with other tribes of northern Europe.  
See OLD WEST FRISIAN SKELTANA RIUCHT (Sydney Fairbanks trans. 1939); LAWS OF EARLY 
ICELAND:  GRÁGÁS I AND II (Haraldur Bessason & Robert J. Glendinning eds., Andrew Dennis, 
Peter Foote, & Richard Perkins trans. 1980).  
103 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
104 Introduction, in SAXON MIRROR:  A SACHSENSPIEGEL OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 7-8 
(Ruth Mazo Karras & Edward Peters eds., Maria Dobozy, trans., University of Pennsylvania 
Press 1999). 
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In other words, the Saxon law, despite the plethora of rules and penalties 
permitting resolution of disputes is fundamentally meant as text for the populous, 
in the vernacular, so that they might better measure themselves.  It is law that is 
informative in nature.   
In summation, it is possible to think about law and legal information as 
something other than resources for efficient exploitation.  Not so long ago, even 
the modern study of law carried transformative impact.  Law books were even 
worthy of perusal during one’s leisure time, read out loud while sipping drinks 
with friends after working hours.  Legal texts were the kind of reading one 
recommended to a friend or a close sibling, with the expectation that the literary 
adventure, although difficult, would exalt one’s thinking and character.  Legal 
education was a life long quest—the kind of journey that produced giants worthy 
of drafting constitutions and governing nations.  It is thus possible to think 
otherwise about law and legal institutions. 
IV. Prologue to Future Law Librarianship—Dealing With 
Obsolescence 
As the opening quote suggests, the emergence of information 
technologies has threatened modern librarianship with obsolesce, or at least the 
perception thereof.  Furthermore, because of law’s traditional dependence on 
highly structured repositories of legal information, the same threat applies to law 
and legal thinking.  Law can also be thought of as a resource to be harnessed, 
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exploited, and ultimately rendered obsolete.  “Ask not for whom the bell tolls, it 
tolls for thee.”105  The fates of libraries and law are intertwined. 
Despite the gloom, the shared fates of law and libraries are predicated on 
a worldview that reduces their status, along with everything else, to mere 
resources, suitable for exploitation.   However, this outcome is not foreordained, 
and the fundamental aim of every law library ought to be to remind its patrons 
and constituents to dare to think otherwise—to see the law in its true, 
transformative essence.  If law librarians do not play this important role, the battle 
may be lost entirely. 
In fall of 2004, I participated in Salzburg Seminar, Libraries in the Twenty-
First Century.  A product of the conference was a document entitled Vision of the 
Communal Role of Libraries.  The statement emphasizes the role of libraries as 
cultural institutions.  
The library is a place where knowledge and information freely dwell 
to define, empower, preserve, challenge, connect, entertain and transform 
individuals, cultures and communities. The dwelling place, whether 
physical or virtual, is the product of collective reflection, aspiration, 
commitment, expertise and organization. It is both a byproduct of civil 
communities and a catalyst for cultural progress, inspiration, expression 
and exchange. Its absence in this new century would not only deprive 
                                            
105 John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions,  XVII, in JOHN DONNE: SELECTED 
POETRY AND PROSE 166 (T.W. Craik & R.J. Craik eds., 1986). 
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many individuals of important resources, but also, more significantly, such 
loss would deny humanity an essential portion of its shared identity and 
entitled liberties. The library can never be fully replaced by information 
technologies. For the essence of its communal role is not the 
technological mastery over knowledge and information, but rather the 
provision of sanctuary for human thought and expression in any 
medium.106 
The statement is intended to counter perceptions of libraries as obsolete 
resources and emphasizes the role of libraries as cultural institutions.  Of 
particular importance is the role of libraries in defining and enabling communities 
and as serving as transformative institutions and sanctuaries for human thought 
and character.  Despite their unique features, the same statement could be 
applied equally well to law libraries.   
In conclusion, let me suggest four ways in which the legal academy and 
librarians can think about law libraries that will avoid reducing the library to mere 
technologies or resources, in Heidegger’s sense, and which will facilitate 
recognition of the library’s larger role as a cultural and transformative institution: 
Library as Portal to the World 
                                            
106 Salzburg Seminar, Libraries in the 21st Century, Vision of the Communal Role of 
Libraries (March 31, 2005), http://www1.law.umkc.edu/faculty/callister/Session422/statement.pdf. 
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Besides the pragmatic recognition that many libraries serve more virtual 
visitors than physical patrons, the library must serve as a window to a wider 
world; allowing patrons to access unfamiliar places and ideas. 
Library as Social Knowledge Networks 
An organization’s principle value is not its physical assets, but what the 
organization “knows”—including both the information it accesses and stores and 
the collective knowledge, wisdom, and social relationships of the organization’s 
members—in this case the knowledge, skill, and relationships of the librarians. 
Library as User Behavior and Character 
The transformative impact of a library on its users and constituents is a 
prime justification for its continued existence.  Not only should research skills and 
information literacy drive much of a library’s effort, but the library’s impact on the 
overall character and education of its users must be emphasized.  Consequently, 
it will never do for law libraries to simply “train” students in legal research skills.107  
Library as Transformative and Communal Place 
As addressed in the Salzburg Statement, the law library provides 
sanctuary for human thought and expression and serves an important role in 
defining the respective cultures of the law schools and legal profession.  It is a 
temple to which patrons may withdraw from the world, if only for a brief moment, 
to reorient their moral compasses, reflect on their ideals, remember who they 
                                            
107 For extensive discussion on the theme of training versus education, in the context of 
legal research instruction, see Paul Douglas Callister, supra note 13, at 7 (2003). 
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are, and discover the entirely unexpected (including the intellectual and moral 
fiber at the heart of the profession). 
In closing, remember the noble character of libraries and the 
transformative power of law.  These twin, glorious institutions represent far more 
than resources for human consumption, subjugation and exploitation.  It is not 
simply the futures of libraries and legal professions that are at stake, but the 
underpinnings of civilization and the continuing tenure of the rule of law. 
